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Privacy of a lossy bosonic memory channel
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We study the security of the information transmission between two honest parties realized through
a lossy bosonic memory channel when losses are captured by a dishonest party. We then show that
entangled inputs can enhance the private information of such a channel, which however does never
overcome that of unentangled inputs in absence of memory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communications concern the study of quan-
tum channels that also use continuous alphabets [1].
These can be modeled by bosonic field modes whose
phase space quadratures enable for continuous variable
encoding/decoding. Lossy bosonic channel, which con-
sists of a collection of bosonic modes that lose energy en
route from the transmitter to the receiver, belongs to the
class of Gaussian channels which provide a fertile test-
ing ground for the general theory of quantum channels’
capacities [2] and are easy to implement experimentally
with high accuracy level (beam splitters or squeezers are
examples of Gaussian operations) [1]. Hence, the increas-
ing attention devoted to channels with memory effects,
where the noise may be strongly correlated between uses
of the channel, has been extended to bosonic channels [3].
The main motivation that has led to investigate memory
effects in such channels has been the possibility to en-
hance their classical capacity by means of entangled in-
puts [4, 5]. Thus, the quest for effectiveness of entangle-
ment inputs in other kind of capacities. Here we study
the private classical information capacity [6] of a lossy
bosonic memory channel. We use the model introduced
in Ref.[4] where the memory effects are realized by con-
sidering quantum correlations among environments act-
ing on different channel uses [3]. We then analyze the
security (privacy) of the channel when there is a third
dishonest party, who captures the information lost dur-
ing the process of transmission between the sender and
the receiver, i.e. the eavesdropper accesses the environ-
ment’s final state. We shall show that entangled inputs
can enhance the private classical information capacity [6],
but not above that of unentangled inputs in absence of
memory. This is in contrast with what happen for simple
classical information capacity [4, 5].
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II. THE MODEL
Let us consider a 2-shot bosonic channel with corre-
lated noise, acting on two independent modes of the elec-
tromagnetic field associated with the annihilation opera-
tors aˆ1, aˆ2. Here, each mode aˆk (with k = 1, 2) interacts
with an environment mode bˆk through a beam splitter of
transmittivity η ∈ [0, 1], modeling losses.
For single mode Gaussian channels it is conjectured
that Gaussian inputs suffice to achieve the classical ca-
pacities. Here we do not question this generally admit-
ted conjecture coming form Ref.[2], and we assume it to
be also valid for two-mode (memory) channels, likewise
Refs.[5]. Hence, we consider a general Gaussian input
as a mixture of entangled (two-mode squeezed) coherent
states, given by
|ψ (µ1 , µ2)〉 = Sˆa(r)
[
Dˆa2(µ2)|0〉a2Dˆa1(µ1)|0〉a1
]
, (1)
where Dˆak(µk) = exp
(
µkaˆ
†
k − µ∗kaˆk
)
is the single k-
mode displacement operator, corresponding to the com-
plex number µk and Sˆa(r) = exp
[
1
2
r
(
aˆ†1aˆ
†
2 − aˆ1aˆ2
)]
de-
notes the two-mode squeeze operator [1], with r the en-
tanglement parameter between the two inputs (r = 0
refers to input product states). Let us write the input
(1) as a density operator
ρin (µ1 , µ2) = |ψ (µ1 , µ2)〉〈ψ (µ1 , µ2) |. (2)
Then, we assume such states weighted with the Gaussian
probability distribution
P (µ1 , µ2) =
1
pi2N2
exp
(
−|µ1|
2 + |µ2|2
N
)
, (3)
where N is the average photon number per channel use.
In practice, due to entanglement, the effective average
photon number per channel use will be Neff = N +
sinh2 r.
According to Ref.[3], we introduce the correlations be-
tween the environment actions on the two channel uses
by a two-mode squeezed vacuum state,
ρenv = Sˆb(s) [|0〉b2 |0〉b1 b1〈0|b2〈0|] Sˆ†b (s) (4)
2where Sˆb(s) = exp
[
1
2
s
(
bˆ†1bˆ
†
2 − bˆ1bˆ2
)]
with s the mem-
ory parameter (s = 0 corresponds to memoryless case).
In our model, the interaction between input and environ-
ment is characterized by the beam splitter transformation
[1]
aˆk 7→ √η aˆk −
√
1− η bˆk, (5)
bˆk 7→
√
1− η aˆk +√η bˆk. (6)
As consequence the input and environment states are
mapped onto a global (possibly entangled) state ρ
ρin ⊗ ρenv 7→ ρ. (7)
Then, on one hand, the receiver will get the output state
ρout = Trb1b2(ρ). On the other hand, the losses might be
captured by a dishonest party, the eavesdropper, access-
ing the environment’s final state ρeve = Tra1a2(ρ).
Since we deal with Gaussian states, it turns useful
to work with Wigner distribution functions [1]. Let
qk , pk be the quadrature variables of aˆk, i.e. the clas-
sical variable corresponding to qˆk = (aˆk + aˆ
†
k)/
√
2, pˆk =
−i(aˆk − aˆ†k)/
√
2. Moreover, let µRk , µ
I
k be the real and
imaginary part of µk. We introduce the row vectors in
R
4,
u = (q1, q2, p1, p2) , (8)
µ =
(
µR1 , µ
R
2 , µ
I
1, µ
I
2
)
, (9)
and the real 4× 4 matrix
Ar =


cosh 2r − sinh 2r 0 0
− sinh 2r cosh 2r 0 0
0 0 cosh 2r sinh 2r
0 0 sinh 2r cosh 2r

 . (10)
The Wigner function corresponding to ρin in Eq.(2) reads
Win(u;µ) =
1
pi2
exp
[−uAruT − µArµT + 2µAruT ] .
(11)
Moreover, let us denote by
v = (x1, x2, y1, y2) (12)
the real 4-component vector of the quadrature variables
xk, yk associated with the environment operators bˆk, i.e.
the classical variable corresponding to xˆk = (bˆk+ bˆ
†
k)/
√
2,
yˆk = −i(bˆk − bˆ†k)/
√
2. Then, the Wigner function corre-
sponding to ρenv of Eq.(4) reads
Wenv(v) =
1
pi2
exp
[−vAsvT ] , (13)
where As is given by Eq.(10) with the replacement r → s.
To go further on, let us define the vectors in R8
γ = (u,v) , θ = (u,0) , τ = (0,v) , κ = (µ,0) .
(14)
We can write the total (input plus environment) Wigner
function, corresponding to ρin ⊗ ρenv as
Win (u;µ)Wm (v) (15)
=
1
pi4
exp
[−γAγT + 2κAγT − κAκT ] ,
where A is the 8× 8 diagonal block matrix
A =
( Ar 0
0 As
)
. (16)
As consequence of Eqs.(5), (6) the signal-noise cou-
pling corresponds to the change of variables
γT −→ BγT (17)
produced by the unitary beam splitter matrix
B =
( √
η I √1− η I
−√1− η I √η I
)
, (18)
with I the 4 × 4 identity matrix. By using Eq.(17) into
(15) we obtain the total Wigner function after the inter-
action between input and environment, thus correspond-
ing to the state ρ of Eq.(7)
W (γ;κ) =
1
pi4
exp
[−γ BTAB γT
+2κAB γT − κAκT ] . (19)
III. PRIVATE CLASSICAL INFORMATION
CAPACITY
Integrating Eq.(19) over the variable v (resp. u), we
get the output (resp. eavesdropper) Wigner function,
Wout(θ;κ) (resp. Weve(τ ;κ)). It means to have the
following correspondences
ρout ↔ Wout(θ;κ) =
∫
dv W (γ;κ), (20)
ρeve ↔ Weve(τ ;κ) =
∫
duW (γ;κ). (21)
Averaging over the input distribution (3), we also have
ρout ↔ W out(θ) =
∫
dµ P (µ)Wout(θ;κ), (22)
ρeve ↔ W eve(τ ) =
∫
dµ P (µ)Weve(τ ;κ). (23)
From Eqs.(20), (21), (22), (23) taking into account
3Eq.(14), we get the following Gaussian functions
Wout(u;µ) =
1
(2pi)2
√
det Vout
exp
[
−1
2
uV −1out u
T (24)
+
√
ηµV −1out u
T − 1
2
ηµV −1out µ
T
]
,
Weve(v;µ) =
1
(2pi)2
√
det Veve
exp
[
−1
2
vV −1eve v
T (25)
+
√
1− ηµV −1eve vT −
1
2
(1− η)µV −1eve µT
]
,
W out(u) =
1
(2pi)2
√
detV out
exp
[
−1
2
uV
−1
outu
T
]
, (26)
W eve(v) =
1
(2pi)2
√
detV eve
exp
[
−1
2
vV
−1
evev
T
]
, (27)
whose covariance matrices result
Vout =
1
2
[
ηA−1r + (1− η)A−1s
]
, (28)
Veve =
1
2
[
(1− η)A−1r + ηA−1s
]
, (29)
V out = Vout +
1
2
η NI, (30)
V eve = Veve +
1
2
(1− η) NI. (31)
Since any excess information the receiver has relative
to eavesdropper can in principle be exploited by receiver
and sender to distill a shared secret key [7], it makes sense
to consider the difference between output and eavesdrop-
per Holevo’s information as guaranteed privacy of the
channel [6]. Hence, we introduce the private information
normalized to the number of channel uses
Ip(2) =
1
2
(χout − χeve) , (32)
with
χout = S (ρout)−
∫
dµP (µ)S (ρout) , (33)
χeve = S (ρeve)−
∫
dµP (µ)S (ρeve) , (34)
being S the von Neumann entropy. The supremum of pri-
vate information (32) represents the 2-shot private classi-
cal information capacity [6]. Due to the initial conjecture
about optimality of Gaussian encoding and the general-
ity of the state (1), it amounts to the maximum of Ip
over parameter r.
The symplectic eigenvalues of covariance matrices (28),
(29), (30), (31)
λout,j =
1
2
[1− 2 η (1− η) + 2 η (1− η) cosh 2(r − s)]1/2 ,
(35)
λeve,j =
1
2
[1− 2 η (1− η) + 2 η (1− η) cosh 2(r − s)]1/2 ,
(36)
λout,j =
1
2
{
1 + η2
(
N2 + 2N cosh 2r
)
+2 η (1 − η) [cosh 2(r − s) +N cosh 2s− 1]}1/2 ,
(37)
λeve,j =
1
2
{
1 + (1− η)2 (N2 + 2N cosh 2r)
+2 η (1 − η) [cosh 2(r − s) +N cosh 2s− 1]}1/2 ,
, (38)
allow to calculate the entropies in Eqs.(33) and (34) as
[2]
S(ρout) =
2∑
j=1
g
(
|λout,j | − 1
2
)
, (39)
S(ρeve) =
2∑
j=1
g
(
|λeve,j | − 1
2
)
, (40)
S(ρout) =
2∑
j=1
g
(
|λout,j | − 1
2
)
, (41)
S(ρeve) =
2∑
j=1
g
(
|λeve,j | − 1
2
)
, (42)
where g(x) = (x+ 1) log2(x + 1)− x log2 x.
It results that Eqs.(39) and (40) do not depend on µ,
hence we straightforward get χout and χeve of Eqs.(33)
and (34) since both integrals amount to 1.
IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
We are now in the position to analyze the behavior
of the quantity Ip of Eq.(32). Since we want to bound
the effective average photon number per channel use, in
practice we fix Neff as the effective input photon number
and we consider N varying as function of r (N = Neff −
sinh2 r), limiting the range of r to those values for which
N ≥ 0.
Another parameter to take into account is the beam
splitter transmittivity η. We distinguish three limit
cases. For η = 1, the channel is not a lossy channel,
thus the whole information arrives to the receiver; i.e.
Ip ≥ 0 and it is maximum with respect to η. For η = 1/2
the receiver and the eavesdropper have the same infor-
mation; i.e. Ip = 0. For η = 0 the whole information is
lost and captured by the eavesropper; i.e. Ip ≤ 0 and it
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FIG. 1: Private information Ip versus the entanglement pa-
rameter r. Curves from top to bottom are for s = 0, 1, 2, 3.
The values of other parameters are η = 0.8 and Neff = 2.
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FIG. 2: Private information Ip versus the entanglement pa-
rameter r. Curves from bottom to top are for s = 0, 1, 2, 3.
The values of other parameters are η = 0.2 and Neff = 2.
is minimum with respect to η. Here we present two inter-
mediate situations: η = 0.8 (Fig.1) and η = 0.2 (Fig.2).
In Fig.1 the private information Ip is shown vs. the
entanglement parameter r for different values of the de-
gree of memory s, for an input photon number Neff = 2.
For s = 0 the behavior of Ip is symmetric with respect
to the value r = 0, at which it attains the maximum.
That is, entangled inputs are no way useful in the mem-
oryless case. As soon as the degree of memory increases
(s > 0) the symmetry is broken. For a certain range of r’s
values the function Ip goes above its value correspond-
ing to product input state (r = 0). This clearly shows
an improvement of the security of transmission through
a memory channel, due to entangled inputs instead of
product states. However, the effectiveness of entangled
inputs in presence of memory never overcomes that of
unentangled inputs in absence of memory (the maxima
of the curves for s > 0 are below the maximum of the
curve for s = 0). This is in contrast with what happen
for the simple classical capacity [4, 5].
It is also intuitive that by increasing the memory
strength, the private information becomes lower and
lower until flattening to zero. In fact, correlations among
the (classical) symbols help the eavesdropper in predict-
ing them, while completely uncorrelated symbols would
avoid that.
In Fig.2 the privacy information vs. the entanglement
parameter r is negative, as it is expected for η ≤ 1/2.[9]
Hence, in such cases the channel does not represent a
secure mean for information transmission even in pres-
ence of memory. The actual security threshold η = 1/2
recalls those found for secure continuous variable crypto-
graphic key distribution [8]. In particular, our model cor-
responds to lossy channel coherent attack where also the
receiver is allowed to perform general collective measure-
ments. Thus, due to the symmetry between receiver’s
and eavesdropper’s operations, the security threshold co-
incides with that of individual attacks η = 1/2 [8].
It is straightforward to extend the studied model to
many uses of the channel, by employing the same cor-
relation strength among all environment modes (like in
Ref.[4]), that is by employing an operator Sˆb of the form
exp
[
1
2
s
∑
k 6=k′
(
bˆ†k bˆ
†
k′ − bˆk bˆk′
)]
. In such a case we can
observe that the quantities χout and χeve are linear in the
number of uses (number of modes). Thus, Ip(n) = Ip(2)
and the presented results still hold. A much more de-
manding task would be the study the private classical
information when non symmetric noise correlations are
involved in many channel uses, i.e. when the memory
has a finite range over channel uses. However, we forecast
the same conclusions about the effectiveness of entangled
inputs.
In conclusion, we have studied the private classical in-
formation capacity for a lossy bosonic channel including
memory effects. We have shown the possibility to en-
hance it by means of entangled inputs with respect to
product states. However, the effectiveness of entangled
inputs in presence of memory never overcomes that of
unentangled inputs in absence of memory. This is in
contrast with what happen for simple classical capacity.
[1] Braunstein S. L. and Pati A. K. Quantum Informa-
tion Theory with Continuous Variables, Kluwer, Dodrecht
(2001); Braunstein S. L. and van Loock P. Rev. Mod.
Phys. 77, 513 (2005).
[2] H. S. Holevo, M. Sohma and O. Hirota, Phys. Rev. A 59,
1820 (1999); H. S. Holevo, R. F. Werner, Phys. Rev. A
63, 032312 (2001).
[3] V. Giovannetti and S. Mancini, Phys. Rev. A 71, 062304
(2005).
[4] G. Ruggeri, G. Soliani, V. Giovannetti and S. Mancini,
Europhys. Lett. 70, 719 (2005).
[5] N. Cerf, J. Clavareau, C. Macchiavello and J. Roland,
Phys. Rev. A 72, 042330 (2005); N. Cerf, J. Clavareau,
J. Roland and C. Macchiavello, quant-ph/0508197.
5[6] I. Devetak, IEEE Trans. Inf. Th. 51, 44 (2005).
[7] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Th. 24, 339
(1978).
[8] F. Grosshans, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 020504 (2005).
[9] Ip shows a mirror symmetry with respect to abscissa when
η → (1− η) and a mirror symmetry with respect to ordi-
nate when s→ −s.
